The role of the diplomatic relations of Turkey and Great Britain in the twentieth century's international relations

The relationship between Turkey and Britain shifted dramatically in the twentieth century, with the one-time diplomatic defender of Ottoman integrity emerging as its most formidable foe during the First World War and War of Independence. Despite this history of enmity, Turco–British relations entered a period of remarkable recovery in the years after 1923 as potential areas of conflict, such as the status of Mosul province and militarization and access to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, were resolved.

Keywords: Turkey, Britain, diplomacy, Empire, Anglo-Turkish relations, League of Nations, Atatürk, foreign policy, Atatürk foreign policy concept and etc.

Introduction: Turkish foreign policy during 1923 to 1939 experienced a change as revolutionary as the domestic transformation from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century. The First World war had enormously altered the political equilibrium of Europe and the world at large. It had created discontended states, altered the role of the former European powers, brought new states into being, and contributed to the formation of new groupings tending towards a fresh balance of power. In this transitory state of post-war European politics, very few of the newly-created small states were able to pursue a clearly defined and independent foreign policy without becoming a satellite of any of the powers. Turkey was a notable exception among these newly-created states.

Discussion: In the period 1923 to 1930, some of the unresolved and thorny issues of the Lausanne Conference were settled. These were, the question of the location of foreign embassies in Turkey, the legal status of foreign schools established, the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, and the settlement of the Mosul dispute. In the process of the settlement of these issues, it became once more clear that the West remained reluctant to adjust its policies towards Turkey, and this contributed to a delay in the establishment of cordial relations. On the question of the place of residence of foreign ambassadors, in'spite of the declaration of the Turkish Government indicating that the new capital was Ankara, France and Britain maintained that they would send their ambassadors only to Istanbul. To this end, both governments took unilateral decisions and put them into effect. This was received by the Turkish Government as an act of disrespect to the independent Turkish state. In 1925, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ronald McNeil, stated in the British Parliament that: It has been decided that His Majesty’s representative in Constantinople shall hold the rank of Ambassador... He will visit Angora as occasion may arise, and will be represented there permanently by a member of his staff (1).

Without any consideration of Turkish domestic developments, the western powers, during 1923 to 1930, adopted what could be described as a ‘hostile’ political attitude whilist Soviet Russia became her close ally. Nevertheles, the basis of friendly relations with the Balkan and Middle Eastern countries was laid during this period.

The last barrier to an Anglo-Turkish diplomatic rapprochement was the Mosul dispute which was primarily territorial. It contributed, however, to the prolongation of the tension in Anglo-Turkish political relations down to 1926, and also tested the League of Nations severely in its international role in solving disputes satisfactorily, whilst affecting, at least in the short-run, the attitude of the small states towards the League. The main reason for the failure of the attempts to find a satisfactory solution of the Mosul issue at Lausanne was the conflict between Anglo-French and American interests. By the 1920 San Remo agreement, France and Britain had decided to collaborate in exploiting the mineral resources of the world. This decision had been opposed by the United States which insisted on the ‘open door’ principle for American economic participation in all parts of the world. Turkey took advantage of this oil conflict between the powers. The Turkish Petroleum Company, which was mainly a British venture founded in 1900 by the concession of the late Ottoman Government, had the right of exploitation of oil sources in the Middle East (2).

Between 19 May and 5 June 1924, negotiations took place between Britain and Turkey in Istanbul which ended in deadlock because Turkey insisted on a plebiscite in the area whilst Britain firmly opposed this and insisted that Turkey should simply cede the territory. Hence the Mosul dispute was referred to the League of Nations. The League Commission found a plebiscite impracticable and partition undesirable. They ruled that legally the disputed territory belongs to Turkey and not to Iraq. They recommended union with Iraq on the condition that the British mandate should be extended from four years of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to a period of twenty-five years... If these conditions were not carried out, the territory was to revert to Turkey. Only two days before the League’s decision on Mosul, Britain declared that she was ready to take over Iraq for twenty-five years. The Turks’ natural reaction was to view the League of Nations as an instrument of the Great Powers to impose their will on the smaller states.

According to The Statist, firstly, there was no practical evidence to justify the increase in expenditure of Britain in Mesopo-potamia, secondly, the possibility of friction with the Moslems in the area might have repurcussions in India, and finally, the fact that the Turkish attitude would be hostile to Britain should be considered because Mosul was of vital importance to Turkey. The journal concluded that:... all things considered, Great Britain will not be a loser if the League Council decides in favor of Turkey (3).

Meanwhile border incidents over Mosul became serious. In November 1925 British forces attacted Hakkari, on the grounds that Turkish troops had violated the Iraq border. This caused the Turkish Government to declare that, in case of any further aggression, Turkey would retaliate. As regards the oil interests of Britain, Turkey had already announced that the British pipe-line could run along the Bagdat railway to the sea, rather than through French Syria. At this stage of the Anglo-Turkish conflict a section of the British press felt that: the Mosul issue means for Great Britain either friendly relations with the new Turkey, together with a prudent curtailment of a useless commitment, or unremitting Turkish hostility, besides unknown perils in other directions (4.)

In 1930 the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Turkey was signed, to be followed in subsequent years by clearing arrangements. In 1932, the year in which Turkey became a member of the League of Nations, The Times praised Turkish foreign policy highly for its consistent pursuit of peaceful foreign relations with all countries, an attitude which eventually evoked a response in the west as first Italy and then Britain entered into friendly formal relations with her. The Economist drew attention to Turkey’s pacific foreign policy, commenting that: It is noteworthy that a movement born out of a national struggle for existence has not been tempted by its success into passing over to the offensive... Turkey has renounced all ambition in the Balkan, and likewise her former Arab provinces. This moderation is a sign of strength, and encourages hopes for the future progress of Turkey (5).

In May 1933, Turkey signed a commercial agreement with Greece to promote an increased volume of trade and she removed a prohibitive law under which certain classes of Greek nationals were prohibited from working in Turkey. Turco-Greek friendship was very favourably received in Britain and viewed as a great step in the promotion of stability in the Balkans.

Indeed the history of Turco-Greek relations since 1930 ought to be read, marked and inwardly digested by all nations of Europe. For, if the hatchet can be buried by two peoples who have been burdened by the terrible Greco-Turkish heritage of mutual injury and mutual hatred, there is no excuse left for any of the rest of us to confess ourselves morally incapable of preforming the same feat.

In the face of European rearmament, Turkey made a formal request for negotiations in April 1936 to the co-signatories of the 1923 Straits Convention and also to the League of Nations for removal of the clauses of demilitarization in the Straits region. This demand was met favorably by the British press, which claimed that: Assuredly the League signatories — other than Italy of the Straits Convention, cannot ask the Turks to continue to expose themselves to the risk of being treated like Abyssinia(6).

Conclusion: The Turkish Government sought British backing in her demand for remilitarization of the Straits for Turkey believed that her foreign policy was parallel to that of Britain. In the Italo-Absysinian dispute, the Turkish Government had whole-heartedly backed British policy and shouldered its obligations under the League Covenant against Italy, a posture damaging to her economy because of the large Italian share in Turkish overseas trade. A month before the Montreux Conference the prospects of British support to Turkey were encouraging. The Times claimed that if Britain backed Turkey at Montreux, Anglo-Turkish friendship would be sealed and a great contribution made towards peace in the Near East, it furher added that: A distinguished member of the diplomatic corps in Angora has described the recent improvement in relations between Great Britain and Turkey as a second Anglo-Turkish honeymoon.

References:

1. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 181,9 March and 17 March 1925, 921, 2091.
2. Vere-Hodge, E. R., Turkish Foreign Policy 1918–1948 (Ambilly-Annemasse, 1950) 41–2
3. “Great Britain and Mosul”, The Statist, CVI, 5 September, 1925, 341.
4. “The Mosul Problem”, The Statist, CVI, 19 September, 1925, 415.
5. “Turkey and Her Neighbours”, The Times, 23 June 1928.
6. “Turkey Asks for Revision”, The Economist, СХХШ, 18 April 1936, 122