The perception of national identity among students in Kazakhstan

The purpose of this work is to critically assess and examine the perception of national identity among students and young people in Kazakhstan. This area of study represents an important academic focus. Above all, the development of national identity among young Kazakhs has emerged as an important focus of study in the post-Soviet era (Laruelle, 2019; Blum, 2011). In particular, seeking to understand the factors and processes which affect the assumptions of national identity on the part of young Kazakhs such as students is a developing area of study and analysis (Laruelle, 2019).

The assessment in this work begins by briefly outlining the recent historical development of the state of Kazakhstan in terms of its political structure and the transition from Soviet republic to independent state. This is followed by a detailed assessment of the factors that influence and affect the perception of national identity among students and young people in Kazakhstan. Such analysis utilises empirical data that has been gathered which points to an eagerness to project a distinctly national Kazakh identity among younger generations in the country. This is personified by an interaction between primordial and modernist assumptions of identity formation. Thus, it is possible to argue that young Kazakhs have sought to move away from Russian cultural influences and embrace the impact of economic globalisation, liberalisation, individuality and consumerism. Nonetheless, they retain a strong opposition to western values such as democracy and the imposition of western cultural traditions through the conduit of globalisation. Therefore, the post-Soviet era has been personified by the emergence of a distinct Kazakh national identity which accepts cultural pluralism, whilst at the same time protecting traditional cultural practices and norms.

In the empirical study of student attitudes, Asiya et al (2014) found that 42 % of respondents considered globalisation to be a positive process. Moreover, the study found that 70 % of respondents pointed to a willingness to embrace global processes and trends such as those found in fashion, technology and music. In this sense, the empirical data offered by Asiya et al (2014) would seem to suggest that young people, in particular students in Kazakhstan have a positive outlook with regard to the processes of globalisation and that in terms of identity, they are content with the impact that globalised functions have on their lives and outlook. However, critical assessment of the data points to divergent conclusions in this regard. In particular, Asiya et al (2014) also found that 35.8 % of respondents were concerned with the cultural framework in which globalisation is founded, in particular the westernised manner in which that cultural framework operates. As such, a fair proportion of those questioned in the study felt that globalisation was serving to supplant and augment the development of a national Kazakh culture and that the projection of western values through the application of globalisation poses a threat to the internal national progression of a cultural identity that is distinctly Kazakh in nature. In this sense, the data results derived from the study carried out by Asiya et al (2014) points to a dialectic divergence in terms of the manner in which Kazakh students conceptualise globalisation and its impact on their conception of a national Kazakh identity. Although responsive and supportive of globalisation in terms of its technological developments and increasing access to globalised cultural material, students expressed concerns that the westernised cultural framework of globalisation adversely impacted upon the formation of national identity based on an essentially Kazakh outlook. It is important to note that this assumption that globalisation has assumed a westernised foundation is one which is widely proffered in many parts of the world and thus represents the development of a concerted backlash against globalisation, in particular the cultural outputs that occur from globalised processes (Crouch, 2018; Michie, 2017; Tomlinson 2013).Nonetheless, the innate assumption of an anti-western sentiment within the respondents that took part in the study carried out by Asiya et al (2014) points to the potential that Russian influence, with its heavy focus on anti-western sentiment continues to affect the cultural identity of Kazakh students and the outlooks they assume as a consequence.

However, it is important note to overstate the influence of Russian outlooks with regard to the cultural identity of young Kazakhs such as students. In particular, Asiya et al (2014) found that an eagerness to protect and propel a uniquely Kazakh identity was paramount for students in the study, with a strong emphasis on language represented the central conduit through which identity is formed and developed. Added to this, Asiya et al (2014) also suggest that fathers’ ethnicity and religion also assume importance facets in the formation and development of national identity among students. Malik (2019) supports the idea that Islam has played a key role in the formation of post-Soviet national identity in Kazakhstan. Moreover, Asiya et al (2014) found that 88 % of Kazakh students were aware of their national traditions and customs, with 52 % percent being keenly aware. This compared to only 33 % of Russians and 33 % of other minority groups. The study also found that 28.8 % of Kazakh students actively follow and adhere to their national traditions and customs, whilst 42.8 % followed such practices due to the influence of national policies and conditional factors.

The empirical study carried out by Asiya et al (2014) therefore highlights the presence of a clear sentiment of national identity among students in Kazakhstan. This identity and its development are shown to be heavily rooted in the national language, which is considered to be the cornerstone of identity itself. Nonetheless, although it is possible to suggest that identity among Kazakh students is heavily affected by issues relating to national culture and tradition, the impact of globalisation and an eagerness to garner the benefits of globalised processes also exists, despite concerns over the impact of globalised western cultural factors. Therefore, although young Kazakhs are positive about the implications for globalisation, they are evidently concerned about the cultural impact on national identity that occurs from globalisation and are very eager to project and sustain their unique and distinct Kazakh identity, whilst at the same time engaging in the technological and economic transformation that is associated with globalisation.

Given the above, it is credible to suggest that the data results derived from the study carried out by Asiya et al (2014) supports the idea that in terms of applying theory, the perception of national identity on the part of Kazakh students conforms to an interaction between primordial and modernist outlooks. On the one hand, a primordial sentiment develops in terms of linking modern national identity with that of previous epochs through the use of culture, tradition and in particular, language. However, the eagerness to embrace globalisation, albeit with cultural reservations, does indicate that young people in Kazakhstan conceptualise their national identity through reference to modernist agendas. This assumption of an interaction between primordial and modernist interpretations of national identity is reinforced in some ways by studies carried out by Laruelle (2019). In particular, Laruelle (2019) suggests that young people in Kazakhstan who have grown up in the post-Soviet era have retained a strong measure of traditional focus in a way that is personified by conformity with the traditional assumptions of their parents, such as the need to focus on family values, marriage and having children. Laruelle (2019) thus found that inter-generational relations in Kazakhstan are broadly effective, and that young people have affinity with their parents’ generation in terms of how social life should be conducted. In this sense, young Kazakhs are far from being revolutionary in their outlook but rather tend to focus their outlook and identity on the basis of traditional family relationships (Laruelle, 2019). As such, it is possible to link this formation and propagation of identity with a primordial mentality that links culture and national identity across generations in a way that personifies reference to ancient assumptions of what it is to be Kazakh. In supporting the primordial sentiment, the conclusions reached by Laruelle (2019) in many ways conform to those of Asiya et al (2014), in particular with regard to the importance of traditional customs and outlooks in terms of their influence on young people.

Moreover, Laruelle (2019) pays very close reference to the manner in which young Kazakh’s differ in outlook with regard to older generations in terms of their conceptualisation of economic processes, consumerism and broader globalisation. In particular, Laruelle (2019) points to the fact that young Kazakh’s are generally supportive of the liberal economic agendas that stem from the west, thus moving away from their communist Russian/Soviet legacy. As economic liberalism is central to economic globalisation, it is thus possible to see convergence between the data offered by both Laruelle (2019) and Asiya et al (2014). Added to this, Laruelle (2019) suggests that young Kazakhs are not disposed to the values of the west and although they have embraced liberalism in the economic realm, they are far less concerned with liberal political practices, in particular democracy. The data provided by Laruelle (2019) also concurs with the conclusion reached by Asiya et al (2014) with regard to young people’s acceptance of cultural pluralism and the imposition of a pluralist cultural acceptance at the national political level. In this sense, it is possible to see how modernist assumptions do affect the outlook of young Kazakhs in terms of their national identity, with a close interaction remaining with primordial conservative assumptions.

Laruelle (2019) also reinforces the fact that although young Kazakhs have no clear affiliation with western values and cultural traditions, they have nonetheless played a key role in moving away from the influence of Russian cultural identity in the country. Sources point to the fact that traditional areas of Russian cultural influence in Kazakhstan focus on urban industrial areas, whereas the traditional focus for Kazakh identity is found in more rural areas (Olcott, 2002; Fergus, 2003). However, Laruelle (2019) suggests that in recent years there has been a shift in this cultural makeup as increasing rural migration to urban areas has personified an increasingly Kazakh cultural identity in towns and cities. The old divide between a Russian urban and Kazakh rural population, although still evident and relevant in many respects, has therefore been directly challenged and changed by the actions, outlooks and movements of younger generations in the country.

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